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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
387. A waiting room for street cars, Dodge v. North End Improvement
Ass'n. (1915), 189 Mich. 16, 155 N. W. 438; a playground for children,
tennis and croquet grounds, Caulfield v. Berwiclk (1915), 27 Cal. A. 493,
150 P. 646, as well as the granting of a license for holding short period
race meets, Neb. City v. Neb. City Speed and Fair Ass'n. (1922), 107 Neb.
576, 186 N. W. 374. In view of these decisions and especially that con-
cerning the tourist camp, to which an airport may be likened appropriately,
the court in the case of City of Wichita v. Clapp, supra, was apparently
correct in its decision that an airport was a proper park use and of course
a public purpose.
Many states have authorized their cities, through statutory enactments,
to procure and maintain land for an airport Laws of Georgia 1927, P.
779; Public Acts, Conn. 1925, ch. 249; Laws of Mass. 1922, ch. 534, par. 57;
Laws of Mont. 1927, ch. 20. A section of the Kansas aircraft act reads:
"That whenever in the opinion of the governing body in any city in the
state of Kansas, the public safety, service and welfare can be advanced
thereby, such governing body of such a city may acquire by purchase ur
lease and maintain a municipal field for aviation purposes and pay the
expense of such purchase, lease, or maintenance out of the general funds
of the city. Such a field may be used for service of all aircraft and pilots
desiring to use the same." R. S. Kan. 1923, 3-110.
The objection that the establishment of an airport may be a public pur-
pose and yet not a municipal function has met with no success, and has
given little difficulty to the courts in disposing of it. It may be said that
generally local affairs are manageable by local authority and those not so
localized in character by the state. Dysart v. City of St. Louis, supra. It
has even been held that the building of a bridge between two cities was a
municipal function. People v. Kelley (1879), 76 N. Y. 475; Haunsler v.
St. Louis (1907), 205 Mo. 656, 103 S. W. 1034. In view of the general
tendency to enlarge the scope of the municipality in its power to promote
the public welfare and enjoyment, the statutes authorizing municipal air-
ports, and the recent adjudications on the subject, little doubt can be enter-
tained as to the correctness of the decision in Dysart v. City of St. Louis,
supra. F. E. M., '30.
PUBLIC UTILITIES-REGULATION-PowER TO CONTROL PAYMENTS TO HOLD-
ING COMPANIEs.-In a proceeding in the nature of quo warranto, state tele-
phone company held ousted of the right to have credit in computation of
rates for payments to foreign company under license contract. The evi-
dence showed that the state company, organized under Comp. Laws 1915,
sec. 8788-8796, was controlled by, and was a mere instrumentality of, the
foreign company. A general judgment of ouster was not required under
sec. 13536 et seq. People ex rel Potter, Atty.-Gen. v. Michigan Bell Tele-
phone Co., (Mich., 1929), 224 N. W. 438.
On its face this action was brought to oust the Michigan Bell Telephone
Company of its franchise. The main purpose was to oust the license con-
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tract between the American Telephone and Telegraph Co. and the Michigan
Bell Telephone Co., one of the subsidiary companies of the American Com-
pany, and the order of ouster went only to that extent. This procedure was
suggested in re Michigan Bell Teleph. Co., P. U. R. 1926 C. 607, 621. The
contract provides that the Michigan Company pay 4% per cent of its gross
revenue to the American Company in exchange for the use of certain
licenses and the furnishing of various services. For a discussion of this con-
tract see "Problem of Regulation of Payments by Utility to Holding Com-
pany" 14 ST. L. LAW REv. 299. The various state commissions have objected
to such payments without some showing of reasonableness of the payment or
some relation to the cost of the service or the value thereof. Re New York
Teleph. Co., P. U. R. 1925 C. 767; re Michigan Bell Teleph. Co., P. U. R.
1926 C. 607; re Wisconsin Teleph. Co., P. U. R. 1927 A. 581. But the Su-
preme Court has held that where there is nothing to show bad faith or an
abuse of discretion, the commission cannot substitute its judgment for that
of the board of directors of the utility. State of Missouri ex rel Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission (1923), 262 U. S. 216, 31
A. L. R. 80; City of Houston v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. (1921),
259 U. S. 318. Thus the commissions have not been able to sit in judgment
as to the reasonableness of such payments. Indiana Bell Telephone Co. v.
Public Service Commission (1924), 300 F. 190; State of Kansas ex rel Hop-
kins v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. (1924), 115 Kan. 236, 223 P. 771;
Michigan Utility Commission v. Michigan State Teleph. Co. (1924), 228
Mich. 658, 200 N. W. 749.
The court in the principal case found that the Michigan Company was
entirely controlled by the American, which owned practically all the com-
mon stock of the former company, so that the Michigan Company became
the mere agent or instrumentality of the American Company. On this
basis the court disregarded the corporate entity of the Michigan Company
and says that it is "no more engaged in conducting and carrying on a
telephone business than is the ordinary station agent engaged in con-
ducting and carrying on the railroad business of his employer." There-
fore, the court takes the next step and says that the contract can not stand
because the American Company can not contract with itself.
This case differs from the Houston case, supra, and the Southwestern
Bell case, supra, in that here the court finds reason to disregard the cor-
porate entity while in the other two cases the question of disregarding the
corporate fiction did not come before either the lower courts or the Supreme
Court. Nor has the question of the license contract ever been presented
to the Supreme Court in this light. The case of Chesapeake and Potomac
Teleph. Co. v. Whitman (1926), 3 F. (2) 938, comes the closest to present-
ing the same issue. There the Maryland Commission and the United
States District Court both went so far as to hold that the Maryland Com-
pany had no will of its own and was entirely controlled by the American
Company, but the case was never appealed to the Supreme Court so that
court did not have an opportunity to consider the question from this view-
point.
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This case will undoubtedly be taken to the Supreme Court of the United
States. What attitude it will take is uncertain. It might very well follow
the Southwestern Bell case, supra, and hold that this is a contract entered
into within the discretion of the board of directors of the Michigan Com-
pany. On the other hand it might decide that this is a proper case to dis-
regard the corporate entity. Such a position is strengthened by the fact
that the Supreme Court of Michigan has taken that attitude.
R. B. S., '30.
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